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Abstract 
A portfolio manager can obtain profits from charging management fees to individual investors for helping them to invest. 
Moreover, as an insider, the portfolio manager can obtain proportional brokerage charges on the return on investment by 
investing the individual investors’ money that he manages. How does the manager balance money management and 
investment to maximize his total profits? This is the problem that we study in this article. We model the relationship 
between money management fees and the amount invested. In addition, we investigate how to determine money 
management fees and the amount of investment needed to maximize the manager’s total profits, including from 
management fees and brokerage charges. 
Keywords: money manager, institutional investor, individual investor, insider, money management fee 
JEL: G20, C02, C52 
1. Introduction 
Portfolio managers always play a vitally important role in financial markets. They can encourage individual investors to 
invest in risky assets by providing investment assistance. Moreover, as insiders, portfolio managers can aﬀect the 
liquidity and equilibrium prices of risky assets in the financial market. Therefore, many researchers are interested in 
portfolio managers. 
There is a substantial literature on incentives in principal-agent relationships. Sap-pington discusses the frictions that lie 
at the heart of incentive problems and proposes the principal’s optimal responses to these frictions (see Sappington, 1991). 
Prendergast illustrates an incentive for workers to conform to the opinions of their supervisors when firms use subjective 
performance evaluation (see Prendergast, 1993). In a continuous-time principal-agent framework, Hui studies the 
contracting problem between an individual in-vestor and a professional portfolio manager(see Hui, 2003). In the same 
framework, Kraft and Korn study the issue of how to delegate an investor’s portfolio decision to a portfo-lio manager(see 
Kraft and Korn, 2008). In a discrete-time principal-agent framework, Liu and Liang study the portfolio selection and 
contracting problems between an individual investor and a professional portfolio manager (see Liu and Liang, 2009). 
Sato proposes a model of asset market equilibrium with portfolio delegation and optimal fee contracts(see Sato, 2016). 
Our novelty is, in the CPT setup, concentrating on trust as distinct from performance in shaping incentives. Many 
researchers focus on incentives for money man-agers. Chevalier and Ellison, using semiparametric modeling, report that 
the shape of the flow-performance relationship creates incentives for fund managers to raise or reduce the riskiness of a 
fund and that these incentives depend on the fund’s year-to-date return (see Judith and Ellison, 1997). By examining the 
labor market for mutual fund managers, they find that “termination” is more performance-sensitive for younger managers 
(see Judith and Ellison, 1999). They also identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination-performance 
relationship. The shape of the termination-performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid 
unsystematic risk. Inderst and Ottaviani focus on distorted incentives to sell financial products, distortions that arise not 
only from actual kickbacks but also from the diﬃculty of incentivizing salesmen to sell the appropriate prod-ucts (see 
Roman and Ottaviani, 2009, 2012a,b). Guerrieri and Kondor demonstrate that performance generates a “reputational 
premium” that influences investors’ decisions to hire or fire money managers (see Veronica and Kondor, 2012). 
Hackethal, Inderst, and Meyer find that retail investors who report a heavy reliance on their advisors’ recommendations 
have a substantially higher trading volume and purchase a higher fraction of investment products that their advisors were 
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incentivized to sell (promoted products)–see Hackethal et al. (2012). Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny focus on the 
incentives of the money manage-ment organization itself when its clients’ choices are mediated by trust (see Gennaioli et 
al., 2015). 
Money managers not only provide investment assistance for individual investors but also invest in risky assets. Because 
they know some information about risky assets, they are al-ways called ”informed traders” or ”insiders”. Their 
investment strategies have considerable influence on the liquidity and equilibrium prices of risky assets in financial 
markets, and therefore, many researchers investigate how managers invest in risky assets. 
We cite the essential literature on incentives for an insider’s trading strategy. Kyle pro-poses a dynamic trading strategy 
with informed insiders (see Kyle, 1985). Huddart et al. provide a solution to a discrete-time analog of Kyle’s(see Kyle, 
1985) rational expectations trading model in which an insider, endowed with long-lived private information, must 
dis-close the quantity that he trades at the close of each round of trading (see Huddart et al., 2001). Ge and Zheng 
investigate both the determinants and potential eﬀects of portfolio disclosure frequency by comparing funds providing 
voluntary quarterly disclosure to funds providing only mandatory semiannual disclosure(see Ge ahnd Zheng, 2015). 
Agarwal et al. examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund 
performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC 
regulation requiring more frequent disclosure (see Agarwal et al., 2015). 
Previous works consider only one type of profits: management fees or brokerage charges. They do not address the 
relationship between management fees and brokerage charges. However, in real markets, both management fees and 
brokerage charges are involved in a manager’s total profits and influence one another. Hence, we focus on the 
relationship between management fees and brokerage charges in maximizing total profits. 
To solve this optimization problem, we discuss the relationship between management fees and brokerage charges in 
greater detail. Assuming that a manager only uses individual investors’ money (and not his own) to invest, the 
management fees aﬀect the amount of investment, the return on investment and the brokerage charge. Specifically, when 
the manager decreases his management fees, his profits from them might decrease. However, as the management fees 
decrease, more individual investors might prefer the manager’s assistance, and thus, the funds managed by the manager 
might then increase. Hence, both the returns on investment and brokerage charges increase. Conversely, when the 
manager increases his management fees, his profits from them might increase. However, as the management fees increase, 
fewer individual investors might prefer the manager’s assistance, and thus, the funds managed by the manager might then 
decrease. In this case, both the returns on investment and brokerage charges decrease. 
This relationship means that a manager has to balance the level of management fees and the amount of funds invested 
with him to remain viable in a competitive financial market. This issue is the key problem we research in this article. To 
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address this problem. As mentioned above, our research is a closer 
approximation of a real market than are previous works. 
However, this original problem presents us with some diﬃculties. In terms of market characteristics and research 
perspectives, money management and investing in risky assets are diﬀerent problems. Hence, previous work uses 
diﬀerent research methods to solve the two problems. However, in our research, we need to simultaneously consider 
money man-agement and investment in risky assets. How do we investigate the two problems within a unified research 
framework? This is the primary diﬃculty in our work. Moreover, we should not only model this relationship between 
management fees and brokerage charges but also formulate the optimization problem for total profits. Furthermore, based 
on this model, we need to study how to select a suitable amount of investment and a suitable level of management fees to 
maximize the manager’s total profits. In solving these problems, there is no previous experience to follow. We need to 
explore these original problems in innovative ways. Additionally, a computational diﬃculty is to obtain an explicit 
solution of this maximization problem. In contrast to previous work, our model is more complex be-cause it combines 
money management with risky investment. Thus, it is diﬃcult to obtain the explicit solution by straightforward 
computation. Here, we employ Matlab to obtain the solution in explicit form. 
In this article, we only research the manager’s optimal strategies in a single period and not in a multiple periods. Relying 
on the framework of the single-period strategy, we will research the multi-period problem later. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the model, including the basic setup and the 
problem. In section 3, we derive the manager’s optimal strategies to maximize total profits. Section 4 contains the 
numerical analysis. We also compare our results with the results of traditional approaches. 
2. The Model 
2.1 The Basic Setup 
We assume the existence of an institutional investor, market makers and individual investors in the market. Half of the 
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individual investors are noise investors, and the other half are rational investors. 
Trading is structured in three steps as follows: 
In step one, rational investors need to choose whether to invest on their own or to invest with a manager’s assistance. 
Specifically, individual investors feel overly anxious or nervous when they invest in risky assets without assistance 
because they have little financial knowledge and related information. Hence, they are willing to hire money managers or 
advisors to help them invest. Managers may have indispensable knowledge concerning how to diversify investments or 
even how to earn a premium. Additionally, money managers provide investors with peace of mind. However, individual 
investors then have to pay management fees, which decrease the return on a risky asset. Thus, they choose among 
diﬀerent expected utilities. We assume that a rational investor with an insider’s help chooses a portfolio x1 to maximize his 
expected utility: 
 
 
Where R is the risk-free interest rate, r is the excess return on the risky asset predicted by a rational investor, Σ is the 
variance of the risky asset, and f is the fee charged by the institutional investor. 
When the rational investor invests on his own, he chooses a portfolio x2 to maximize his expected utility: 
 
 
If                 , the individual investor prefers the manager’s help. Otherwise, he is willing to invest on his own. In 
this step, a manager needs to determine the amount of the management fees that he will charge, which aﬀects on the 
amount of individual money managed by him. 
In step two, the noise investors invest in the risky asset. Their amount of the investment equals u, which is normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance   . The portfolio manager, as an insider, can observe the liquidation value of the 
risky asset, denoted v, which is normally distributed with mean p0 and variance Σ. The random variables v and u are 
independently distributed. Based on his observation of v, the manager invests x in the risky asset. To accommodate mixed 
strategies, the insider’s trading strategy, denoted X2, assigns to outcomes probability distributions defined over quantities 
traded. However, mixed strategies are not optimal in what follows; the more intuitive interpretation of X2 as a measurable 
function such that x = X2(v) is justified. 
Here, we note that since individual investors cannot observe liquidation value of the risky asset, they do not know the real 
excess return on the risky asset, v p0 R. Thus, in equation (2.1) and equation (2.2), they only use their estimated value r. 
However, individual investors can estimate the variance based on statistics from historical data. We assume that this 
estimated variance is approximately equal to the real variance Σ. Hence, the individual investors use Σ in equation (2.1) 
and equation (2.2). 
In step three, the market makers determine the price p at which they trade the quantity necessary to clear the market. 
When doing so, they observe x + u but not x or u (or v) separately. While their pricing rule, denoted P , can be defined to 
accommodate randomiza-tion, an intuitive interpretation of P as a measurable real function such that p = P (x + u) is also 
justified. 
We assume that the amount of the manager’s investment depends on the amount of funds he manages. In other words, the 
institutional investor only uses the rational investors’ funds that he manages to invest and does not use his own funds to 
invest. 
Assume that    is the amount of funds managed by a portfolio manager who maximizes total management fees and that   
is the optimal investment in the risky asset that max-imizes the brokerage charges. If          , the manager only 
needs to charge the optimal fees, as in previous work (see Gennaioli et al., 2015). Then, he invests     in the risky asset 
(see Kyle, 1985) and invests            in the risk-free asset. With this strategy, the manager can obtain the maximal total 
fees and the maximal brokerage charges. That is, the manager only needs to choose the same optimal management fees 
and portfolio as in previous work (see Gennaioli et al., 2015; Kyle, 1985) to maximize his total profits. Therefore, this 
article mainly focuses on the case in which          . When           , the manager has to invest all of the funds that he 
manages managed in the risky asset to maximize his total profits. Therefore, we assume that 
 
 
 
 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 6, No. 4; 2019 
65 
 
Where X1 is the total amount of funds that the institutional investor manages for the rational investors, X2 is an amount of 
the institutional investor’s investment, and p is the risky asset’s price as determined by the market makers. 
2.2 The Problem 
First, we separately consider the management fees and brokerage charges. Then, we propose the maximization problem 
for total profits. 
The manager’s profits from management fees, denoted Π1, are given by Π1 = f X1. Let the brokerage rate be q. Then, the 
manager’s brokerage charges from investment in the risky asset, denoted Π2, are given by                 . 
The expected value of his total profits is as follows: 
 
 
Our objective is how to choose f, X1 and X2 to maximize the function U. That is, 
 
 
Traditional works only consider one type of profits: management fees (see Gennaioli et al., 2015) or return on investment 
(see Kyle, 1985). However, our optimal profits include both management fees, f X1, and brokerage charges, q(v p)X2. 
Moreover, in contrast to Kyle’s work (see Kyle, 1985), we consider the brokerage charges rather than all of the return on 
the investment. Because we stipulate that the manager only uses individual investors’ money (and not his own) to invest, 
the manager only gains a percentage of the return, q, in the form of the brokerage charges. 
3. The Results 
In this section, we obtain the key result, which is the manager’s optimal strategy. 
Theorem 3.1. The risky asset's price determined by the market makers is 
 
 
 
The money manager's optimal strategy is as follows: the amount invested in the risky asset is 
 
 
And the management fee is 
 
 
Where 
 
 
 
 
 
And lambertw( ) is the Lambert W function. 
The proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix 6.1. 
Regarding Kyle’s work (see Kyle, 1985), our          are consistent with his results, while our p and diﬀer from his 
results. 
The quantity       measures the ”depth” of the market, i.e., the order flow necessary to induce prices to rise or fall by one 
dollar. In our results, this measure of market liquidity is still proportional to the ratio of the amount of noise trading to the 
amount of private information that the informed trader is expected to have. This means that the insider’s strategy cannot 
aﬀect market liquidity. Moreover, our result echoes the view of Bagehot (see Bagehot, 1971) and Kyle (see Kyle, 1985) 
that market makers compensate themselves for bad trades that result from adverse selection by insiders by making the 
market less liquid. 
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   reflects the impact of the liquidation value of the risky asset on the amount invested in the risky asset. Our is still equal 
to 1=2 which reflects the same impact of v on the investment in the risky asset as in previous works. This impact is 
proportional to this measure of market liquidity and is not related to the principal-agent market. 
In Kyle’s research (see Kyle, 1985), p only depends on p0, and X2 + u. However, our p depends on                in 
addition to p0,   and X2 + u. That is, the excess return on the risky asset estimated by individual investors influences the 
price p. In other words, the behavior of the individual investors in the principal-agent market impacts the price 
determined by the market makers in the capital market. The connection between the two markets is linked to the behavior 
of the portfolio manager. Specifically, the excess return on the risky asset estimated by individual investors aﬀects the 
management fees charged by the portfolio manager and the amount of money managed by the portfolio manager. The 
amount of money managed by the portfolio manager influences the amount of investment in the risky asset, which further 
aﬀects the price p determined by the market makers in the capital market. Kyle’s work shows that is only related to 
(the measure of market liquidity) and p0. However, our is related to the estimated excess return on the risky asset r and the 
brokerage rate q in addition to      and p0. This is because we consider the optimal amount of investment to maximize 
total profits, including the brokerage charges and management fees. The brokerage charges are related to the brokerage 
rate. Moreover, as mentioned above, the management fees and the amount of investment are influenced by the estimated 
excess return, r. Hence, is related to r and q. That is, the amount of the investment in the risky asset is related to r and q. 
4. Numerical Simulation 
In this section, by numerical simulation, we test the sensitivity to riskiness of the risky asset. Let the risk, Σ, increase from 
1:0 to 5:0. We compare our results with the classical results on the sensitivity of the amount invested (see Figure 1), the 
sensitivity of the price (see Figure 2), the sensitivity of the management fees (see Figure 3) and the sensitivity of total 
profits (see Figure 4). We set = 0:5, q = 0:03, = 1 and p0 = 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The sensitivity of the optimal investment to the risks 
Figure 1 shows that our optimal strategies are more sensitive to the risks of the risky asset than those of Kyle (see Kyle, 
1985). When the variance of the risky asset, Σ, increases from 0.1 to 5.0, the manager’s investment in the risky asset 
decreases from 30% to 2% in our model, while the manager’s investment in the risky asset remains at approximately 5% 
in Kyle’s model. When Σ is less than 2:0, the investment in our model is more than that in Kyle’s model; when Σ increases 
from 2:0 to 3:0, the investment in our model is almost as much as the investment in Kyle’s model; when Σ is more than 3:0, 
the investment in our model is less than the investment in Kyle’s model. In our model, the sensitivity of individual 
investors to risk aﬀects the management fees and the amount of money managed by the manager in Step 1. This amount of 
the money further aﬀects the amount invested in the risky asset in Step 2. Thus, the sensitivity of individual investors to 
risk aﬀects the optimal strategies for total profits. However, in Kyle’s model, the optimal investment is only aﬀected by 
the sensitivity of the manager who is the insider in Step 2. Because individual investors are more sensitive to risks than are 
insiders, our strategies are more sensitive than Kyle’s strategies. 
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Figure 2. The sensitivity of prices to risk 
Figure 2 displays that the price in Kyle’s model (see Kyle, 1985) is closer to the real liquidation value of the risky asset 
than is the price in our model. This reason is that, in Kyle’s model, when the market makers determine the price, they only 
consider the impact of the total amount of the insider’s investment and the noise investors’ investment. However, in our 
model, the market makers consider not only the impact of the total amount invested but also the impact of the rational 
individual investors in Step 1. Specifically, the excess return of the risky asset estimated by the individual investors 
influences the price. This numerical result is consistent with the theoretical result in Theorem 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The sensitivity of management fees to risk 
From Figure 3, we find that, in Gennaioli et al.’s model (see Gennaioli et al., 2015), the fees increase as the variance 
increases from 0.1 to 5.0. This reason is that the individual investors prefer to share more risks with the manager as risk 
increases. Thus, they are willing to pay higher fees to the manager. These fees are not related to the liquidation value of 
the risky asset in Step 2. However, because we consider total profits, which are aﬀected by the liquidation value of the 
risky asset, the fees are also influenced by the liquidation value of the risky asset. Hence, our fees oscillate according to 
the liquidation value of the risky asset. 
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Figure 4. The sensitivity of total pro ts to risk 
Figure 4 shows that if the manager chooses our optimal strategies, he will gain more total profits than by using the 
traditional strategies. This result demonstrates that jointly considering the management fees and the investment is 
preferable to considering the man-agement fees or the investment in isolation. If we only consider the management fees, 
when the optimal strategy maximizes the management fees, this strategy might make the return on the investment small, 
which would lead to low total profits. Hence, in this case, this strategy is not the optimal strategy with respect to total 
profits. Considering only the return on the investment in the risky asset produces a case similar to the above. 
Appendix 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 
Let the insider’s profits from the rational investors be Π1 and his return through investment in the risky asset be Π2. Then, 
the expected value of his total profit is as follows: 
 
 
Noting that                       and X1 = X2, we have 
 
 
To maximize his total profits, we obtain the derivative of this expected value with respect to X2 and set it equal to zero: 
Since E[u] = 0, we have 
 
 
Now, we consider how to obtain the expressions for f(X2) and f
′(X2). To maximize a rational investor’s expected utility, we 
take the derivative of his expected utility          with respect to x and set it equal to zero: 
 
 
 
Thus,                 When the rational investor has the assistance of a trusted and experienced instituational 
investor , his optimal portfolio is           
The investor needs the insider’s assistance provided that                 which is equivalent to 
 
 
Hence, the amount of funds managed by an insider charging f is given by 
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Using Matlab, we obtain 
 
 
where lambertw( ) is the Lambert W function. 
Based on the Taylor series expansion of the Lambert W function, we obtain that 
 
 
Hence, we have 
 
 
 
Applying the Taylor series expansion of f′(X2)X2 + f(X2) at X2 = 0 to (4.3), we obtain 
 
 
We rearrange terms to obtain 
 
 
Now, it is easy to see that 
 
 
 
Since v and X2 are normally distributed, from the Projection Theorem, we have 
 
 
 
Note that   is the slope of a line plotting a random dependent variable X2 or X2 + u with respect to an independent 
random variable v. That is,                                Thus, 
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Let                              We can demonstrate that p0 = E[v]. 
From            we have  
 
We rearrange terms to obtain 
 
Thus,            Therefore, 
 
 
and 
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